Kelley v. Comm Social Security by unknown
2005 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-13-2005 
Kelley v. Comm Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 
Recommended Citation 
"Kelley v. Comm Social Security" (2005). 2005 Decisions. 851. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/851 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





                                     Appellant
vs.
JO ANNE BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security
                       Appellee
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
Civil Action No. 02-3572
District Judge: Honorable John W. Bissell
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 27, 2005
___________
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ALITO and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 13, 2005)





Geraldine Kelley appeals from the final order of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner”) to deny her claim for social security disability benefits. 
The Commissioner determined that Kelley had not established the existence of an
impairment of the requisite severity and duration prior to the expiration of her insured
status.  Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports this determination, we
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
As we write only for the benefit of the parties, we state only those matters essential
to our limited discussion.  A detailed account of the background of the case, including the
relevant medical evidence, may be found in the District Court’s opinion, Kelley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 02-3572 (D.N.J. June 30, 2004), from which we take the
following facts.
Kelley applied for social security disability benefits in or around October 1994,
alleging disability since March 15, 1980 due to bipolar illness.  The Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denied her application, both initially and upon reconsideration,
finding insufficient evidence to document a disabling impairment for any period prior to
June 30, 1984, the date Kelley was last insured for disability benefits.  Kelley thereafter
filed a timely request for de novo review before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
 The Appeals Council specifically instructed the ALJ to:1
• Give further consideration to the claimant’s maximum residual functional
capacity and provide appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of
record in support of the assessed limitations (20 C.F.R. 404.1545 and Social
Security Rulings 85-16 and 96-8p).
• Obtain evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed
limitations on the claimant’s occupational base (Social Security Ruling 85-15). 
The hypothetical questions should reflect the specific capacity/limitations
established by the record as a whole.  The Administrative Law Judge will ask the
vocational expert to identify examples of appropriate jobs and to state the
incidence of such jobs in the national economy (20 CFR 404.1566).
Order of Appeals Council dated April 22, 1999.
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repeating her claim of total and continuous disability since March 15, 1980.  The ALJ
found that Kelley suffered from a severe schizoaffective disorder and a severe obsessive
compulsive disorder, but that she nonetheless retained the residual mental functional
capacity to return to her past relevant work.  As such, the ALJ concluded that Kelley was
not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act (the “Act”) at any time
through the date of his decision, which was rendered in August 1996.
On April 22, 1999, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded
the matter to the ALJ to give further consideration to Kelley’s maximum residual
functional capacity and to obtain evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of
the assessed limitations.   Upon remand, however, the ALJ went beyond these directives1
and reviewed Kelley’s application anew.  In a decision dated February 8, 2000, the ALJ
concluded that Kelley did not have any documented impairment for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months prior to the expiration of her insured status (June 30,
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1984).  Inasmuch as Kelley failed to meet the threshold burden of establishing a “severe
impairment” prior to June 30, 1984, thereby defeating her claim for disability benefits, the
ALJ found it unnecessary to reconsider its ruling regarding Kelley’s residual functional
capacity.
Kelley again sought Appeals Council review, but the Appeals Council concluded
that there were no grounds for such review, which thus exhausted all administrative
remedies and constituted the Commissioner’s final ruling.  Kelley then instituted the
present action in federal court, challenging the Commissioner’s final ruling denying her
claim for benefits.  The District Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision to deny
benefits, finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision that Kelley was
not continuously disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status.  
This timely appeal followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the
Commissioner’s determination to deny benefits, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining
whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).  Substantial evidence is “‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’”  Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)).  Substantial
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evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” 
Jesurum v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.
1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). 
In order to establish a disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must
demonstrate that there is some “‘medically determinable basis for an impairment that
prevents him from engaging in any “substantial gainful activity” for a statutory
twelve-month period.’”  Stunkard v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 841 F.2d 57,
59 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987)); 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).  A claimant is considered unable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy. . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
 The SSA has promulgated regulations incorporating a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is under a disability.  See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520.  Inasmuch as we have set forth each step in detail on prior occasions,
see, e.g., Burnett v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000), we only
summarize these steps to contextualize the issues raised in this appeal.  The
Commissioner inquires whether an applicant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”;
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(3) suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a
listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) is able to
perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)- (f). 
III.
A critical determination here, on which there is no dispute, is that Kelley’s insured
status expired on June 30, 1984.  “To receive disability insurance benefits pursuant to
Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he was insured under the
program at the time of onset of his disability.” Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1131 n.1
(3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).  Kelley was therefore required to demonstrate the
existence of a mental impairment that precluded her from performing substantial gainful
activity for a continuous period of twelve months prior to the expiration of her insured
status.  As we have indicated, the ALJ, upon remand from the Appeals Council, denied
Kelley’s claim for benefits at step two, finding that she did not have any documented
impairment which lasted for a continuous period of not less than twelve months during
the relevant time period.  The sole question presented in this appeal, then, is whether the
ALJ’s step-two determination is supported by substantial evidence. 
A.
Kelley challenges the ALJ’s decision on several grounds, both procedural and
substantive.  Her substantive contentions may be reduced to two: (1) the ALJ’s decision
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ignored probative evidence (emphasizing the initial finding of the ALJ as to her illness, 
see infra III.B) and thus did not permit meaningful judicial review, in contravention of
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981) and its progeny; and (2) the ALJ was
required to obtain the testimony of a medical advisor in determining the disability onset
date, as established in Walton v. Halter, 243 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 2001) and Newell v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 2003).  We address each of these contentions
in turn.
In Cotter, we required the ALJ to provide an explanation of findings, including the
reasons why probative evidence might have been discounted, so as to permit meaningful
judicial review.  642 F.2d at 705.  The problem with Kelley’s argument here is that
virtually no record evidence – medical or lay – supports her claim of disability prior to
June 30, 1984.  Kelley presented no objective medical evidence covering the period from
March 15, 1980 to October 20, 1983, the first day Dr. Oliver-Smith, a treating physician,
recorded a visit by Kelley.  Notably, the last visit recorded by Dr. Oliver-Smith occurred
just seven months later on May 11, 1984.   Thus, the only probative objective medical
evidence for the relevant time period consisted of certain office records from Dr. Oliver-
Smith, covering a period less than the requisite twelve months.  The record contains no
further objective medical evidence until nearly eight years later.  Moreover, as the District
Court rightly noted, the records from Dr. Oliver-Smith, the only relevant
contemporaneous medical evidence, are far from conclusive about the existence of a
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disabling mental impairment.  What these records suggest, rather, is that Kelley, with the
assistance of anxiety medication, was able to engage in some gainful activity, evincing
relatively minor impairments in social or occupational functioning.  
While Dr. Oliver-Smith diagnosed Kelley with “severe obsessive compulsive
disorder,” nothing contained in his reports indicate that Kelley suffered from “severe
obsessive compulsive disorder” for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 
To the contrary, Dr. Oliver-Smith’s notes indicate that Kelley sought out and obtained
work during at least part of the time he was treating her.  After reviewing these records
and considering Kelley’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that the objective findings for the
period in question precluded a finding of disability as that term is defined by the Social
Security Act. 
We acknowledge that the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence of an
objective nature is not necessarily determinative as to the onset date, and to the extent the
ALJ’s decision was based on a legal determination that the onset date of an impairment
had to be proved by such medical evidence, it is erroneous.  See Newell, 347 F.3d at 547.
(“Retrospective diagnosis of an impairment, even if uncorroborated by contemporaneous
medical records, but corroborated by lay evidence relating back to the claimed period of
disability, can support a finding of past impairment.”).  Any such error, however, is
harmless here, given the lack of non-medical or lay evidence supportive of Kelley’s
 We note that the non-contemporaneous medical evidence presented by Kelley is not2
supportive of her claim.  For instance, in a Psychiatric/Admission Note from Fair Oaks Hospital
dated May 4, 1992, it states that “Patient denies history of previous psychiatric treatment or
hospitalization except for periods of ‘stress’ for which she was treated with Valium.”  The report
also states, “Patient denies any history of significant prior medical disorders.”  
Moreover, in Newell, we noted that the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence was
not dispositive where the claimant provides an adequate explanation for the failure to seek
regular medical treatment for the time in question.  347 F.3d at 547.  Here, Kelley offers no
explanation as to why she refrained from seeking regular medical treatment for the period in
question.
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claim.   For instance, Charles and Joan Kelley, whose relationship to Kelley is not2
identified in the record but whom we presume to be Kelley’s parents, stated in 1996 that
they had observed the progression of Kelley’s mental illness “over the past years.”  It is at
least unclear whether “over the past years” refers to a period twelve years earlier, i.e., on
or before June 30, 1984.  In addition, Kelley’s brother, Gene, provided a list of behavioral
problems he had observed from 1984 to 1992.  He reported only that she began washing
her hands constantly in early 1985, at least six months after her insured status expired. 
And finally, Kelley’s husband, William Eldridge, noted some behavior problems after he
married Kelley, but admitted that it was not until “about 1986 [that Kelley] began to have
a problem with dirt.”  He also acknowledged that after the birth of their son in 1980 (the
year Kelley alleged she became disabled), they had “relative peace for a few years.”  
We are satisfied, based upon a careful review of the objective medical records and
the lay evidence relating to the claimed period of disability, that virtually nothing in the
record supports Kelley’s claim of a disabling impairment prior to June 30, 1984.  This
case, therefore, does not present the situation, addressed in Cotter, where probative
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evidence is not credited or simply ignored.  Cotter, 642 F.3d at 706-07.
 Kelley also argues that the ALJ was required to consult a medical advisor, relying
on two decisions – Walton and Newell – subsequently decided by this Court after the ALJ
issued his decision in February 2000.  We disagree.   In Walton, we held that the ALJ
must call upon the services of a medical advisor where the alleged impairment was a
slowly progressing one, the alleged onset date was far in the past, and adequate medical
records for the most relevant period were not available.”  243 F.3d at 709; see also
Newell, 347 F.3d at 549.  Here, the fact is that both the objective medical records and lay
evidence tend to disprove Kelley’s claim of disability prior to June 30, 1984.  Under these
circumstances, the ALJ was not required to obtain the assistance of a medical advisor to
help him infer the onset date.  Kelley’s reliance on Walton and Newell is therefore
misplaced.
B.
Kelley also focuses on certain procedural peculiarities at the administrative level.
She argues that the ALJ’s subsequent decision in February 2000 abandoned, without
justification, his own prior factual findings, findings that were also confirmed by the
Appeals Council.  In particular, Kelley contends that the ALJ’s decision of August 1996
and the Appeals Council’s order of April 22, 1999 both definitively established that she
suffered severe impairments prior to the expiration of her last insured date.  A careful
look at these decisions, however, shows that Kelley is mistaken.  
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In the 1996 decision, the ALJ found that “[t]he medical evidence establishes that
the claimant has a severe schizoaffective disorder and an obsessive compulsive disorder .
. .”  As the Commissioner points out, nothing in the ALJ’s finding, written as it was in the
present tense, specifically refers to Kelley’s impairments prior to the expiration of her
insured status.  To the contrary, the ALJ concluded that Kelley had not been
“continuously and uninterruptedly disabled from March 15, 1980 to [August 26, 1996].” 
We adopt the reasoning of the District Court here:
Because the only medical evidence the ALJ reviewed dating back to the early
1980s indicated that Plaintiff was merely “treated for anxiety and severe obsessive
compulsive disorder[,]” [Kelley’s] current position that the ALJ concluded that
[Kelley] suffered from “severe schizoaffective disorder and a severe obsessive
compulsive disorder” in the 1980s in incorrect.
Kelley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 02-3572 (D.N.J. June 30, 2004), at 19.
Nor are we impressed by Kelley’s contention that the Appeals Council’s remand
order definitively decided that she suffered ‘severe mental impairments documented
throughout the record’ prior to the expiration of insured status.  Contrary to Kelley’s
characterization, the Appeals Council’s remand order excludes any mention of the “prior
insured status” language.  It is evident that the Appeals Council merely restated the ALJ’s
finding, which, as we have stated, makes no mention of Kelley’s disability prior to the
expiration of her insured status.  
Upon remand, the ALJ reformulated the issue to reflect the relevant time period, a
crucial determination that he seemingly ignored in his first decision.  In doing so,
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however, the ALJ merely reaffirmed the prior decisions of the SSA, which held that
Kelley’s “condition was not disabling on any date through June 30, 1984, when [she was]
last insured for disability benefits.”  For these reasons, we cannot agree with Kelley that
either the ALJ or the Appeals Council inappropriately retracted certain findings of fact.
Finally, Kelley argues that the ALJ ignored the directives from the Appeals
Council to re-evaluate her residual functional capacity.  In effect, the Appeals Council
directed the ALJ to reassess his step-four determination.  Instead, the ALJ reformulated
the issue, properly recognizing that the “issue[] to be decided [is] whether the claimant
was under a “disability” from her alleged onset date of March 15, 1980 and on or prior to
June 30, 1984[.]”  By making this distinction, the ALJ found Kelley not disabled at the
second step of the sequential evaluation process.  We find it significant that, upon request
for review of the ALJ’s decision, the Appeals Council found no basis for granting the
request, notwithstanding the ALJ’s revised findings. 
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
